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Courts seeking the most likely intent of contracting parties should interpret contracts according
to Bayes’s rule. The best interpretation of a contract reflects both the prior likelihood (base
rate) of a pair of contracting parties having a given intention and the probability that the
contract would be written as it is given that intention. If the base rate of the intention
associated with the simplest reading of the contract is low, then Bayes’s rule implies that the
simplest reading is not necessarily the interpretation of the contract that most likely captures
the intention of the parties. The Bayesian framework explains when default rules should be
more or less sticky and helps to define the appropriate role of boilerplate language in con-
tractual interpretation.
1. INTRODUCTION
When contracts present missing or ambiguous terms, contract law gen-
erally attempts to determine what the “parties meant” to say1 or “would
have said if they had spoken about the matter” (Globe Refining Co. v.
Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 543 [1903]).
Determining what the parties meant to say or would have said is
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1. For expressions of this sentiment spanning 200 years of U.S. history, see, for example,
Graves & Barnewall v. Boston Marine Ins. Co. (6 U.S. 419, 433 [1805]), which states that
“a policy is a contract of indemnity, and that what the parties meant at the time ought to
be carried into effect,” and Harris v. The Epoch Group, L.C. (357 F.3d 822, 825 [8th Cir.
2004]), which states that “this is simply a matter of straightforward contract interpretation.
The only issue, therefore, is what the parties meant when they said.”
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often difficult (Scott and Kraus 2007). It is therefore no surprise that
contract law consists of a multitude of doctrines, decisions, and theories
concerning the appropriate way to uncover the hypothetical or actual
bargain of the parties. Sometimes these decisions appear counterintui-
tive. In the celebrated case of Jacob and Youngs v. Kent (129 N.E. 889,
891 [1921]), for example, Justice Benjamin Cardozo claims to seek the
“reasonable and probable” intent of the parties with regard to the piping
in a house yet appears to overlook the written insistence of the parties
on the use of Reading brand pipe specifically and instead allows an
alternative pipe of equivalent quality to take its place (129 N.E. 889).
More generally, atypical parties have an extremely difficult time obtain-
ing their often explicit bargain in the presence of contract law’s estab-
lishment of doctrines for recreating hypothetical bargains (Goetz and
Scott 1985).
This paper argues that Bayes’s rule provides a useful lens for ex-
amining how contract law recreates bargains. Nearly unmentioned in
prior scholarly work on contractual gap filling and interpretation,
Bayes’s rule provides a mathematical framework explaining how a de-
cision maker should modify existing beliefs about a bargain between
two parties in light of the evidence provided by a written contract. The
modified belief about the hypothetical bargain should equal the prob-
ability that the contract would be written as it is given a particular
bargain, multiplied by the prior belief about the likelihood of that bar-
gain, divided by the total likelihood of the contract’s being written as
it is given any true bargain.
Consider Jacob and Youngs v. Kent from a Bayesian perspective.
Suppose that there are two avenues whereby the contract language call-
ing specifically for Reading brand pipe might have been generated. On
one hand, the language fits naturally if the parties truly intended to use
Reading brand pipe. Alternatively, the parties may have meant merely
to use pipe of Reading quality but inartfully drafted a contract that
seems to insist on the use of Reading brand pipe. It is therefore more
likely that the language in the contract would have been observed if the
parties desired Reading brand pipe than if they simply desired pipe of
Reading quality. So, at first glance, the most likely hypothetical bargain
would seem to be Reading brand pipe, although this intuition is a re-
flection of the base-rate fallacy.
Interpreting the contract to mean Reading brand pipe because it is
the most natural reading of the contract presents an instance of the base-
rate fallacy (Kahneman and Tversky 1973, 1985), a common cognitive
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bias in which the decision maker underweights the prior likelihood of
parties wanting Reading brand pipe (that is, the base rate) relative to
the (written) evidence directly at hand. Suppose that there are many
more parties in the population who prefer pipe of Reading quality rather
than Reading brand pipe. This means that when confronted with a con-
tract that specifically calls for Reading pipe, it may be more likely that
the contract stemmed from parties who wanted pipe of Reading quality
(high prior) and drafted their contract poorly rather than from parties
who wanted Reading brand pipe (low prior) and drafted their contract
well. If this is the case, then the most likely bargain between the parties
is pipe of Reading quality, in spite of the fact that the contract calls for
Reading brand pipe.
Bayes’s rule also explains why courts may be reluctant to respect the
explicit opt-out language of parties seeking to alter a default rule. Pre-
vious scholarship has critiqued this preference for default rules over
explicit language as a result of judicial misunderstanding (Goetz and
Scott 1985), but the preference for default rules may reflect an implicitly
Bayesian approach to contract interpretation. If default rules are ma-
joritarian, then default terms have a higher prior likelihood than do
alternative terms. Language seeking to switch to the alternative term
must overcome the prior weighting toward the default. If the alternative
term has a low prior, then it may be extremely difficult to alter default
rules through explicit language. This difficulty does not stem from any
judicial misunderstanding but, rather, from the courts’ application of
Bayes’s rule.
Similarly, Bayes’s rule explains how boilerplate contractual language
may be sometimes disregarded and sometimes observed. Language that
is not specified by either party provides little evidence to shift prior beliefs
about the likelihood of certain intentions. As a result, prior beliefs may
be given more weight in the presence of boilerplate language than they
would if specific bargaining for language had occurred.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines the law and eco-
nomics of contractual interpretation and gap filling. Section 3 describes
Bayesian contractual interpretation and provides examples of its appli-
cation to Jacob and Youngs v. Kent and Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal
and Mining Co. Section 3 also discusses how Bayes’s rule should be
modified when judges make errors in calculating base rates and inter-
preting the natural reading of the contract. Section 4 applies the Bayesian
contractual interpretation framework to illuminate the status of idio-
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syncratic parties and the devaluation of boilerplate language. Section 5
concludes.
2. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION AND GAP
FILLING
Law and economics scholars have devoted considerable attention to the
best means of filling contractual gaps. Historically, courts aimed to pro-
vide majoritarian default rules or standards, filling gaps to provide what
the parties would most likely have wanted had they considered an issue
(Scott and Kraus 2007, pp. 93–95). Scholars justified this aim by ex-
plaining that it reduces transaction costs. If the state fills in gaps that
the contracting pair would have wanted, then most parties will not have
to undertake the expense of writing contracts that are more detailed.4
Analysis of gap filling shares many similarities with examination of
standards of interpretation of written contracts (Posner 2004). In inter-
pretation, as in gap filling, the traditional legal norm is to implement
what the parties meant. In interpretation, judges simply have more in-
formation than they do when gap filling. In both cases, however, the
information fails to unambiguously point to one ruling.
Despite these similarities, relatively few scholars draw an explicit link
between gap filling and interpretation.5 Goetz and Scott (1985) explain
how default rules contaminate the interpretation of seemingly explicit
written terms. Shavell (2006) examines both gap filling and interpre-
tation in a single framework but assumes that contracts contain either
gaps or unambiguous writings of varying specificity; courts are able to
distinguish between these possibilities and are free to either interpret
unambiguous writings as written or choose an alternative interpretation.
Moreover, Shavellian contracts contain no accidental terms or meanings.
Instead, all terms derive from explicit consideration of the parties, al-
though a court may choose to interpret a contract against the parties’
meaning.
This paper departs from the existing literature in two primary direc-
tions. First, the paper assumes that contractual gaps and ambiguities are
4. For a recent summary of this explanation, along with a critical review, see Schwartz
and Scott (2003, pp. 595–96). In the past 20 years, scholars have frequently articulated
alternative goals for gap filling, such as facilitation of information sharing by the contracting
parties. See, for example, Ayres and Gertner (1989); Bebchuk and Shavell (1991).
5. Exceptions include Posner (1998), Goetz and Scott (1985), Shavell (2006), and Schwartz
and Watson (2009).
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parts of a continuum rather than different modes of analysis. A contract
almost always provides some clue about what the parties might have
wished in unnamed scenarios, even if it does not explicitly detail the
actions associated with the scenario.6 Likewise, even the most specific
and explicit instruction may contain ambiguity if it does not result from
explicit bargaining between parties but, rather, represents boilerplate
language. As a result, the paper applies one uniform analysis to gap
filling and interpretation, which are often treated as distinct problems.7
A second distinction between this paper and previous literature is
that this paper assumes that courts seek to ascertain and implement the
true intentions of the contractual parties. Most of the existing literature,
by contrast, assumes that courts should (and do) aim to maximize social
welfare.8
This emphasis on the recovery of a hypothetical bargain is a con-
ditional one. The argument is not that determining what the parties
would have wanted is the correct goal of contract interpretation. Instead,
the aim is to examine the implications of the hypothetical bargain ap-
proach, taking as a given that the hypothetical bargain approach is the
mode of interpretation. As a practical matter, many (perhaps most)
courts strive to implement what the parties intended. Whatever courts’
reasons for preferring to interpret contract under the hypothetical bar-
gain context,9 the fact is that they do. Papers examining contractual
interpretation from a social welfare perspective may therefore have little
relevance to courts with different maximands.
The hypothetical bargain approach conditionally adopted here cor-
responds to the social-welfare-maximizing approach if contracting par-
ties are ignorant of the law and do not change their drafting behavior
or the quality of their performance in response to interpretative rules.
In this case, a Kaldor-Hicks social-welfare-maximizing court seeks to
6. In the default rule literature, these clues correspond to the degree of tailoring to use
while gap filling. See Ayres and Gertner (1989).
7. For example, one prominent contracts casebook lists four primary functions of con-
tract law, two of which are gap filling and interpretation. See Scott and Kraus (2007, pp.
2–6).
8. An exception to this trend is Posner (1998), which also assumes that courts are seeking
to give the parties what they wanted.
9. A detailed examination of why courts interpret contracts to give the parties what they
wanted is beyond the scope of this paper. The hypothetical bargain context makes most
sense under a corrective justice theory of contract (see, for example, Bridgeman 2007),
under which parties are entitled to have their intended interpretation enforced because that
is the only interpretation to which they truly agreed.
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maximize the welfare of the parties at hand. In the absence of other
information available to the court (such as information regarding
changed circumstances), the hypothetical bargain of the parties repre-
sents the best evidence regarding a welfare-maximizing distribution be-
tween the two parties.
3. BAYESIAN CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION
3.1. Combining Pieces of Evidence Regarding Contractual Intent
Consider the decision of a court interpreting a contract with two possible
meanings. The court interprets the contract to actualize the most likely
intention of the parties, but the court is uncertain regarding which of
the two possible intentions the parties actually meant or would have
meant.
The court uses two pieces of evidence to interpret the disputed term.
First, the court reads the written contract itself. The written terms may
be more likely to result from one intent or another. Thus, the written
contract provides evidence about the true intent of the parties.
The second piece of evidence available to the court is its background
knowledge of the prior likelihood (the base rate) that any pair of con-
tracting parties have one possible intent relative to the other possible
intent. This evidence depends on the existing knowledge of the court
and is independent of the written contract.
Bayes’s rule describes how a court should combine these two pieces
of evidence to arrive at the most likely intent of the parties. The court
should multiply the probability that the written contract would be writ-
ten the way it is, given that the parties desired the first intent, by the
prior probability that any two parties would have that intention. If the
product of these two probabilities is greater than the product of the
same operation for the second possible intent, then the court should
interpret the contract as calling for the first intention.10
A robust empirical literature documents the base-rate fallacy—that
is, the tendency of individuals to overweight the value of new evidence
10. Formally, let , where B is theP (Bp b FW)p [P (WFBp b )# P (Bp b )] /P (W)i i i
true intent of the parties, W is the written document, and bi is the ith possible intent. The
term is the probability of the true intent being given (that is, conditionalP (Bp b FW) bi i
on) . The term is the probability of getting given that the true intent isW P (WFBp b ) Wi
. The term is the unconditional probability that a bargain would be for .b P (Bp b ) bi i i
Finally, is the unconditional probability of finding .P (W) W
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(such as the written contract) and underweight the value of prior prob-
abilities when making judgments (Kahneman and Tversky 1973, 1985).
As a result, judges (and those evaluating the quality of judicial rulings)
are likely to overweight the relevance of written contracts and under-
weight outside evidence when seeking to determine the true intent of
the parties. Bayes’s rule, however, demonstrates that if the natural read-
ing of a contract suggests an intention that is extremely unusual within
the population of contracting parties, then the meaning associated with
the natural reading may be less likely to be the true meaning than an
unnatural reading associated with the more common preference.
It is useful to note that conventional gap filling represents one extreme
of this Bayesian interpretative format. If a written contract does not
provide any evidence in favor of one meaning relative to another, then
the court chooses a meaning based entirely on the prior probability of
one intent or the other. The court chooses the intent that is the more
likely meaning of any two parties that contract—a majoritarian default
rule.
3.2. Illustrating Bayesian Contractual Interpretation in Case Law
3.2.1. Jacob and Youngs v. Kent. To illustrate Bayesian contractual in-
terpretation, consider the celebrated case of Jacob and Youngs v. Kent
(129 N.E. 889 [1921]).11 In Jacob and Youngs v. Kent, the New York
Court of Appeals was presented with a contract between a builder, Jacob
and Youngs, and a landowner, Kent, who hired Jacob and Youngs to
build a home. The contract stipulated that “all wrought iron pipe must
be well galvanized, lap welded pipe of the grade known as standard pipe
of Reading manufacture” and included a perfect-tender condition stating
that “any work furnished by the Contractor, the material or workman-
ship of which is defective or which is not fully in accordance with the
drawings and specifications, in every respect, will be rejected and is to
be immediately torn down, removed and remade or replaced in accor-
dance with the drawings and specifications, whenever discovered.”
While Jacob and Youngs was building the home for Kent, it used
some pipe that was not manufactured by Reading. The pipe that was
used—Cohoes brand pipe—was of similar quality to Reading. Kent’s
architect directed Jacob and Youngs to “do the work anew,” knock down
the home and install Reading brand pipe. Jacob and Youngs refused to
11. For a recent examination of this case criticizing the majority opinion, see Schwartz
and Scott (2008).
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Reading brand pipe 5 0 5
Pipe of Reading quality 10 185 195
Total 15 185 200
do so. When Kent declined to pay a final balance, Jacob and Youngs
sued Kent. Kent claimed that the final payment was not required because
of the failure to install Reading pipe.
In Jacob and Youngs v. Kent, the court was required to interpret the
written language concerning Reading manufacture. Did “Reading man-
ufacture” indicate that the parties specifically meant Reading brand pipe,
or did the parties mean pipe of Reading quality? Alternatively, the court
was required to infer the intended remedy of the parties in the event
that pipe of Reading quality but non-Reading manufacture was used.
As written by Justice Cardozo, the majority opinion of the New York
Court of Appeals concluded that the parties truly intended to demand
pipe of Reading quality. The Cohoes pipe constituted substantial per-
formance, leaving Kent with only nominal damages for the lack of Read-
ing brand pipe. A forceful dissent by Justice Chester McLaughlin em-
phasized that Jacob and Youngs failed to perform its written obligation
to provide pipe of Reading manufacture.
In the Bayesian framework, the Court of Appeals sought the most
likely meaning of the contract given the contract as written and the
background knowledge of the court regarding the likelihood that parties
would mean to specify a specific brand of pipe.
The words “Reading manufacture” are more likely to be used if the
parties specifically intended Reading brand pipe rather than pipe of
Reading quality. Why use the language “Reading manufacture” and
demand perfect tender if the intention of the parties was only to use
pipe of Reading quality?
To quantify this intuition (see Table 1), suppose that there are 200
builder-landowner pairs. All contracting pairs (five [100 percent] of five
pairs) who want Reading brand pipe choose a contract that specifies
Reading manufacture, whereas only 10 (5.1 percent) of 195 pairs of
contracting parties who care about pipe quality would write a contract
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calling for Reading manufacture.12 Although there is some chance that
the words “Reading manufacture” meant Reading quality but the con-
tract was inaccurately drafted, parties who wanted Reading brand pipe
are considerably more likely to write “Reading manufacture” than are
parties who care only about Reading quality.
At this point, it may seem like the dissent has the better argument.
What more does a person have to do to get Reading brand pipe? This
intuition represents an instance of the base-rate fallacy, however, in
which people overweight the most salient information relative to infor-
mation about the underlying base probabilities of different events.
Suppose that the large majority of contracting parties who discuss
piping in contracts care only about pipe quality and not pipe brand. A
total of 195 (97.5 percent) of 200 builder-landowner pairs intend to
specify quality when discussing pipes, whereas five (2.5 percent) of 200
pairs desire a particular brand of pipe, such as Reading.
A court with these pieces of information should decide which un-
derlying intent—Reading brand pipe or pipe of Reading quality—is more
likely, given that the contract specifies Reading manufacture and de-
mands perfect tender. According to Table 1, there will be 15 contracts
that call for Reading manufacture from this population of 200 builder-
landowner pairs. Five of these 15 contracting pairs will want Reading
brand pipe, whereas only 10 will intend to specify Reading quality. The
written contract of Jacob and Youngs v. Kent thus has a two-thirds (10
of 15 contracting pairs) probability of being the result of a desire for
Reading quality combined with poor drafting and a one-third (five of
15 contracting pairs) probability of being the result of a desire for Read-
ing brand pipe combined with good drafting. There are more parties
who desire pipe of Reading quality and express themselves unusually
than there are parties who desire Reading brand pipe and express them-
selves naturally. A court following Bayes’s rule that wants to actualize
the parties’ hypothetical bargain should follow the majority opinion
written by Justice Cardozo and find for pipe of Reading quality.
3.2.2. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. Bayes’s rule also helps
explain the controversial decision of Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal &
Mining Co. (382 P.2d 109 [Okla. 1962]). In Peevyhouse, a mining com-
12. Note that if “Reading manufacture” were used as code for wrought iron pipe (Danzig
1978), then the probability that parties who want wrought iron pipe would use the words
“Reading pipe” would be higher than 2 percent. This would make the Bayesian argument
in favor of Justice Cardozo’s opinion even stronger.
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pany and homeowner signed a contract allowing the mining company
to strip-mine on the homeowner’s land. The contract contained an un-
usual provision providing that the mining company would fill “the pits
dug on said premises.” After the mining operations were finished, the
homeowners requested that the mining company fulfill its contractual
obligations. The mining company refused, and the homeowners sued.
In a much-criticized decision (see, for example, Maute 1995; Linzer
1981), the court ruled that the damages were limited to the small re-
duction in the market value of the land (one possible meaning) rather
than the cost of the filling work (the other possible meaning).
The Bayesian framework provides partial justification for the deci-
sion. The unconventional written terms in the contract calling for the
restorative work provide strong evidence that the parties agreed to have
the work done even if the costs outweighed the benefits. So why not
just interpret the contract according to its plain meaning? This would
be ignoring the base rate. The court in Peevyhouse seems acutely aware
that “it is highly unlikely that the ordinary property owner would agree
to pay $29,000 for the construction of improvements upon his property
that would increase its value only about $300” (382 P.2d 112). In other
words, the court is appealing to base rates. The unconditional probability
of agreeing to such economically “unreasonable and unrealistic” (382
P.2d 112) behavior is minimal. Indeed, the base rate of such unreasonable
behavior may be low enough to justify a holding that appears to con-
tradict the best reading of the contract. The court is saying that it is
more likely that the parties chose terms poorly but did not want eco-
nomically irrational restorative work done than it is that they wrote the
contract well and wanted the work done under any circumstance.
This is not to say that the Peevyhouse ruling is unambiguously correct.
Suppose that there is a third possible meaning, wherein the parties agree to
do restorative work that costs up to five times as much as it adds to land
value. Such an agreement might still be unusual within the population.
However, it is less unusual than the probability that the parties would have
intended restorative work that costs almost 100 times more than it adds to
market value. Indeed, when combined with the written language of the
contract, which makes more sense if the parties agreed to spend more than
the increase in market value, it may well be the case that the best Bayesian
interpretation of the contract is for costs that are five times as much as the
diminution in market value rather than equal to the diminution in value or
the costs of restoration. An intermediate level of damages may well have
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been a better outcome in Peevyhouse than either diminution-in-value dam-
ages or cost-of-completion damages.
3.2.3. Applying Bayes’s Rule When Judges Make Errors. Judicial estimates
of the background probabilities of intentions and the likelihood that
parties would write a certain contract given an intention are both subject
to error (Schwartz and Scott 2003). Moreover, the stronger the court’s
belief about a given probability, the more likely it is that the belief is
overestimated. For example, a court that assumes that no parties would
ever specifically want Reading brand pipe may have underestimated the
probability of desires for Reading brand pipe, but it cannot have over-
estimated them; there cannot be fewer than zero parties who want Read-
ing brand pipe. Alternatively, a court perceiving that “Reading manu-
facture” could have been written only by parties who wanted Reading
brand pipe may be overestimating the clarity of the language but cannot
be underestimating it.
Knowing this possibility of errors, a Bayesian court should discount
strong beliefs about prior probabilities or its ability to infer intentions
solely from the language of the contract. An error-prone court that is
certain that no parties want Reading brand pipe should instead assume
that only a very small minority of parties would want Reading pipe.
Error-prone Bayesian courts should almost never rely exclusively on
either base rates or contractual language when making a decision about
the true intentions of the parties.
4. APPLICATIONS OF BAYESIAN CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION
4.1. Idiosyncratic Parties and Contractual Language
Bayes’s rule provides a benign explanation for the surprising difficulty
that idiosyncratic parties have when attempting to alter state-created
implied terms. Goetz and Scott argue that this difficulty provides evi-
dence that state-created implied terms and explicit terms written by
parties function antagonistically. “[C]ourts’ tendency to treat state-
created rules as presumptively fair often leads to judicial disapproval of
efforts to vary standard implied terms by agreement” (Goetz and Scott
1985).
The Bayesian statutory interpretation perspective discussed above
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provides an alternative explanation for default rule stickiness.14 Suppose
that most state-created default terms are majoritarian: the state aims to
give most parties what they want. Further suppose that efforts to ex-
plicitly opt out of state-created implied terms are at least partially un-
clear. In these circumstances, a majoritarian default rule would seem
difficult to change. The difficulty is not the result of some presumption
that courts make regarding the default rule but, rather, the result of a
Bayesian interpretation of imperfect contractual language. If the base
rate of the default preferences is much higher than that of the idiosyn-
cratic preference seemingly signaled by the contractual language, then
a judge seeking to implement the intent of the parties will often be
justified in choosing a less natural reading associated with a higher base
rate. It will therefore appear that the court is ignoring the parties’ lan-
guage when the court is actually choosing the most likely intention.
Nonmajoritarian default rules, such as penalty defaults, offer a means
of distinguishing between the Goetz and Scott (1985) criticism of courts’
exaltation of default rules and the possibility that courts are Bayesian
interpreters of contracts. If Goetz and Scott are correct that default
terms obtain exalted status, then information-forcing default terms
should be just as sticky as majoritarian default terms. For Bayesian
courts, however, a nonmajoritarian information-forcing default should
be much easier to expressly alter than a majoritarian default. The base
rate of the information-forcing default is lower than that of a majori-
tarian default, making a Bayesian court more likely to read ambiguous
terms as signaling an intent to opt out of an information-forcing default
term.
4.2. The Failure of Language as Evidence of Intent
At this point, the reader may be wondering how idiosyncratic parties
can ever get their desired provisions enforced when courts are Bayesian
interpreters seeking to enforce the most likely intent. When written lan-
guage gives perfect evidence of intent—when there is only one intent
that could be associated with the contractual language in question, even
14. Ben-Shahar and Pottow (2006) provide a signaling explanation for default rule stick-
iness. They do not explain, however, why courts should be reluctant to enforce explicit
occurrences of opting out from default rules once the parties have overcome the signaling
problem.
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Reading brand Pipe 20 0 20
Pipe of Reading quality 10 170 180
Total 30 170 200
accounting for mistakes15—then idiosyncratic parties will always obtain
their desired intention by drafting the appropriate language.
Problems arise, however, when written contractual language gives
imperfect evidence of intent. In these cases, the evidence provided by
contractual language may not be sufficient to overcome a strong prior
against an idiosyncratic provision. Idiosyncratic parties may find it im-
possible to obtain enforcement for their desired provision because of
imperfections in language as an intent-specification technology.
The rarer the preference, the harder it will be to provide strong
enough evidence to overcome the prior belief against the preference. In
Jacob and Youngs v. Kent, for example, if there is always at least a 5
percent chance of the language “Reading manufacture” being used by
mistake, then it will be impossible to have a preference that is rarer than
5 percent enforced by Bayesian courts. If the preference for Reading
brand pipe is less idiosyncratic (for example, if 20 of 200 parties have
this preference; see Table 2), then, by contrast, the same imprecision in
language will not prevent parties from getting a preference for pipe of
Reading brand specifically enforced.16
When language provides weak evidence of intent, it will be more difficult
for parties to overcome a given prior belief. A classic example is a boilerplate
term that is not explicitly considered by the parties’ but is included in a
contract (Goetz and Scott 1985). Boilerplate terms provide weaker evidence
about the parties’ true intent than do identical writings for which explicit
bargaining occurs, because it is easier for boilerplate terms to be included
15. Note that language may be clear on its face (that is, it may follow naturally from
only one possible intention) but still may provide imperfect evidence of intent once the
possibility of mistakes is introduced.
16. When 10 percent of all parties want Reading brand pipe, the revised Table 1 appears
as Table 2, demonstrating that it is more likely that Reading brand pipe is the parties’ true
intention under these assumptions.
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Reading brand Pipe 5 0 5
Pipe of Reading quality 3 192 195
Total 8 192 200
in contradiction to true intent.17 Boilerplate language is a less precise—and
less expensive—intent-specification technology than original language. The
probabilities in Table 1, for example, may reflect the fact that the perfect-
tender term in Jacob and Youngs v. Kent was boilerplate language. If all
the relevant language in Jacob and Youngs v. Kent was original, then Table
1 may need to be revised as shown in Table 3, enabling a Bayesian court
to rule for Kent.
In practice, the quality of the signal indicating the intent of the parties
is likely a function of the cost incurred in writing the contract. Although
it may be impossible to obtain enforcement of an idiosyncratic preference
using inexpensive language that provides weak evidence of intent, such
as boilerplate language, it will more often be possible to obtain enforce-
ment of a strange preference with more expensive bespoke language that
provides greater evidence of intent.18 As a result, idiosyncratic prefer-
ences with high surplus value may be obtainable by incurring a relatively
large drafting expense. As long as even the most careful original drafting
retains some imprecision about the intent of the parties, however, then
it may be impossible to get extremely idiosyncratic intentions enforced
by a court.
17. Morin Building Products v. Baystone Construction (717 F.2d 413 [1983]) (Posner,
J.) is illustrative. The Morin court rejected an assertion that a buyer satisfaction clause in
a contract (allowing the buyer to reject for any reason) applied to aesthetics because the
provision was “not drafted for this contract; it was incorporated by reference to another
form contract.” As a result, the court was “left with more than a suspicion that the [buyer
rejection] clauses in the form contract used here were not intended to cover the aesthetics”
(717 F.2d 415–16).
18. Similar results apply to testing for rare diseases. Because perfect tests for rare diseases
are prohibitively expensive, it may be impossible to prove the existence of a rare disease
with only one test. Instead, multiple rounds of testing may be necessary to prove that an
initial positive test result is not a false-positive result. See Paulos (1995).
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The previous sections present several variations on a theme: Bayes’s rule
prescribes a weighting mechanism for reaching outcomes from ambig-
uous contractual language and preexisting beliefs about the world (base
rates). When preexisting beliefs are sufficiently strong, they justify a court
in contradicting the simple reading of a contract.
In effect, Bayes’s rule demonstrates that the logic of majoritarian
default rules does not end with pure contractual gaps. Although it is
widely accepted that courts fill gaps in contracts with the terms that
would be preferred by the majority of parties, such majoritarian senti-
ments normally cease whenever there is no gap but only an ambiguity.
In these contexts, courts focus intently on the language of the contract,
seeking to find the best reading of its terms. Bayes’s rule, however, es-
tablishes that the logic behind majoritarian rules persists in cases of
substantial or even minimal contractual ambiguity. The majoritarian
preference should weight the reading of the contract; the stronger the
majoritarian preference and the weaker the information provided by the
ambiguous contract, the more a court should choose a meaning that
implements the meaning preferred by the majority. Failure to consider
the majoritarian preference when confronted with a suggestive but some-
what ambiguous written contract represents a form of the base-rate
fallacy and leads to interpretations that are unlikely to implement the
parties’ intentions.
The Bayesian interpretative framework can be expanded to account
for goals outside of giving the parties their true intent. Future work, for
example, might place greater weight on the simple language of the con-
tract than would be justified for purposes of determining intent as an
incentive for parties to draft documents more clearly.
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